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Social media platforms allow users to perform different speech acts: status updates could 
be assertives, a like is an expressive, a friendship request is a directive, and so on. But 
sharing (or “retweeting”) seems to lack a fixed illocutive status: this explains why present 
controversies concerning the sharing of  misinformation have been debated in legal pro-
cedure and discussed from the point of  view of  personal responsibility without reaching 
a general consensus. The premise of  this paper is that the diffusion of  false or unwar-
ranted information could be better analyzed if  we consider sharing a precisely definable 
speech act. I will describe some dominant interpretations of  the act of  sharing that are 
not, however, sufficient to fully explain it. As an alternative, it will be shown that there is 
a specific illocutive structure of  the act of  sharing, which not only consists in asserting 
the “shareworthiness” or the relevance of  a content, but is primarily comparable to an 
“attention-orienting” directive.
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1. Introduction: How to do things with shared words
Sharing third party content in social networks is a widely practiced 
action that allows for content to flow freely in the Infosphere1. But what 
exactly do we do when we share something? Clarifying this point is cru-
cial to issues like the diffusion of  fake news and misinformation. Let us 
take as an example US President Donald Trump and his use of  Twitter. 
In November 2015, as he was campaigning for the US Presidential elec-
tion, he retweeted (that is, he shared someone else’s tweet) crime statistics 
categorized by race and showing data about the high percentage of  black 
murders of  white people (81%)2. According to the most recent data from 
the FBI, the numbers were grossly inaccurate (the rate of  whites killed by 
1 Everything we post on a Facebook “wall” or in any kind of  social network’s feed 
could be generally considered as “sharing” a content, but we will keep here the narrower 
sense of  sharing as posting other people’s content.
2 http://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/statements/2015/nov/23/donald-trump/
trump-tweet-blacks-white-homicide-victims/ (accessed on April 19, 2018).
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blacks was 15%). Despite all the criticism, there were no consequences for 
Trump, who, in his defense, simply declared that he believed the source 
to be reliable. In fact, the original sender (@SexyPatriots, later suspended) 
was neither an expert nor an official source at all.
Spreading false information may have legal consequences, as is the 
case with defamatory content. Defamation in digital communication is 
a complex topic, since legal decisions need to find a balance between 
protecting the accuser’s freedom of  expression and the accused’s rights. 
Moreover, further complications arise when defamatory content is shared 
and spread out in the Internet by users that are not the original author of  
the content. The liability for sharers of  defamatory content in social media 
is in fact uncertain, as we will see in the next section. Although the legal 
debate is not the object of  this paper, these examples show that many 
uncertainties are due to different interpretations of  what is actually done 
when someone shares something, which will be the main point of  investigation 
in this paper. The question is, if  “retweeters” (on Twitter) and sharers on 
Facebook and other similar social platforms are to be considered independ-
ent voices (authors that actively produce content), simply intermediaries, 
or something in-between.
Since Austin’s seminal account on language (1962), we know that we 
can do things with words. Today, we can say that we can do things also 
with the different tools that digital platforms make available. Social media 
allow users to perform different speech acts or illocutions: status updates 
are, using Searle’s terminology (1975a), mostly assertives. Putting a “like” 
or any other emoticon are expressives, friendship requests or flagging are 
directives, and so on. The act of  sharing seems, on the contrary, not to 
be clearly definable. Of  course, we have always shared information, both 
oral and written, as when we say «X said p», which would be a simple 
assertion (that is, a quotation) of  what someone else said. But as we will 
see in details in the next sections, sharing in social networks could not be 
reduced to a simple reporting or quoting.
Moreover, it is not uncommon that when we share content – which 
may be a single statement by another user, a long article in a newspaper, a 
picture or a video – this is seen by the majority of  people as an endorse-
ment, and rightly so. If, in fact, I share the message «We must defend our 
civil rights!» by a political activist that I follow and support, it is plausible 
to see in this act not only an endorsement but also a repetition of  the call 
of  the activist. In this case, “sharing” not only means to “pass on”, but also 
to “agree”. However, as we shall see in the next section, this interpretation 
does not always hold. It is indeed possible to share without endorsing: in 
fact, the widespread disclaimer «Retweet does not mean endorsement» is 
sometimes used on Twitter by users, like journalists, who are sharing mes-
sages or articles from different sources without the intention to take sides.
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Given these differences, a common interpretation is that sharing is an 
act of  spreading information without a fixed illocutive nature and whose 
communicative nature can only be established according to the specific 
context, the speaker’s intention, or the topic of  the shared content. As 
I will try to point out, however, by sharing something in a social media, 
“we do something” specific that can be defined as a well-defined complex 
speech act.
2. The problem of  legal liability
The liability standards for the sharing of  third party digital content 
is largely debated (Collins 2010; Stewart 2013; Allen 2014). A glance at 
contemporary legal verdicts shows that there is no clear agreement about 
the kind of  responsibility we should ascribe to the act of  sharing. Not 
only that, but legal pronouncements and rules vary widely in different 
countries, ranging from very restrictive stances (which make any sharing 
act problematic), to excessively permissive positions (freeing the sharer 
from almost any responsibility).
Two general and opposing stances on this problem can be pinpointed. 
The first one (a “sharer-as-author” view) is represented by cases where 
sharing content is considered sufficient to bear legal or moral responsibil-
ity for the sharer if  the content is defamatory. If  what is communicated 
is considered prosecutable or morally reprehensible, then not only the 
author, but also the sharer, are held as equally responsible. An example is 
the case of  a US Senate candidate who retweeted a third party’s sexist and 
racist message and was consequently pressed to backpedal and finally close 
his account. His defense that he had no intention to offend anyone and 
merely wanted to share other people’s viewpoints was not considered 
tenable3.
Similarly, in the UK it would be a criminal offence to retweet something 
grossly offensive, according to Section 127 of  the Communications Act. 
This Section outlaws messages in social networks that are «grossly offensive 
or of  an indecent, obscene or menacing character». A well-known case 
was the legal action by Lord McAlpine, a politician and former Treasurer 
under Margaret Thatcher who was the subject of  a false allegation of  
child abuse. Comedian Alan Davies had to pay £15,000 damages to Lord 
McAlpine after he retweeted a post which implied that the politician was 
a pedophile. McAlpine announced that he planned to sue about 10,000 
3 https://www.lohud.com/story/news/politics/politics-on-hudson/2014/04/16/
senate-candidate-suspends-twitter-account-never-intention-offend-anybody/7784307/ 
(accessed on April 19, 2018).
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Twitter users, of  which 9,000 had retweeted the defamatory content4. Later, 
the libel claims against users with less than 500 followers were dropped, 
in return for a modest donation to “BBC Children In Need”. Other ex-
treme stances of  “sharer-as-author”-views are represented by legislation 
in countries where the bar for libel is much lower and the risk of  being 
criminally persecuted by sharing content that is considered defamatory is 
high, as it appears to be in Jordan5.
A second, opposite interpretation (a “sharing-as-quoting” view) frees 
retweeters and sharers from most responsibilities related to the nature of  
the shared content. In the US, the Communications Decency Act was passed 
in 1996 with the aim to limit the liability of  Internet service providers and 
websites for third party content. Section 230 of  the law states that «No 
provider or user of  an interactive computer service shall be treated as the 
publisher or speaker of  any information provided by another information 
content provider». This should extend also to retweet and sharing, provid-
ed they a) are not summarized or changed in a way that authorship could 
be attributed to the user, and b) that no new defamatory remark is added 
(Stewart 2013). These rules are not free of  controversy, since Section 
230 partly suspends the so-called “republication doctrine”, in which the 
propagation of  defamatory or damaging material is sanctioned. Moreover, 
this can give rise to opportunistic behaviors, such as the creation of  fake 
accounts or virtual “bots” operating in social networks whose messages 
can be freely retweeted without the risk of  criminal charges.
An interesting case occurred in 2012 when a Swiss politician brought 
an action against a journalist that retweeted a tweet by an anonymous user 
that compared the politician to Adolf  Hitler6. In January 2016, a court in 
Zurich issued a final sentence making reference to traditional legal views 
according to which only the original author is responsible for a message 
(even though in this specific case the author was not identified) and not 
those who spread it. The journalist was therefore declared innocent from 
criminal charges. However, the court decided that the retweet infringed upon 
the personality rights of  the politician and the tweet had to be removed. 
The case attracted a certain media interest, since it concerned the question 
of  how much freedom we should have when we use the “retweet” function 
without fear of  legal consequences. It cannot be excluded that other federal 
courts could have come to different conclusions, since another legal provi-
4 «Twitter is not just a closed coffee shop among friends. It goes out to hundreds of  
thousands of  people and you must take responsibility for it» (McAlpine, source: http://
www.businessinsider.com/lord-mcalpine-sues-10000-twitter-users-2012-11, accessed on 
April 19, 2018).
5 http://en.royanews.tv/news/12759/2017-12-05 (accessed on April 19, 2018).
6 https://www.nzz.ch/zuerich/aktuell/journalist-nach-verbreitung-von-doelf-tweet-
freigesprochen-ld.4504 (accessed on April 19, 2018).
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sion of  the Swiss Penal Code (§173) sanctions the simple distribution of  
defamatory statements (as in handing out leaflets). According to this rule, 
it is irrelevant whether the distributed content is endorsed, the awareness 
of  its defamatory quality would be sufficient to make the spreader liable 
for defamation as well. The question is if  retweeting is comparable to 
handing out defaming leaflets in public.
It should be noted that a simple “like” (an expressive statement, in the 
speech act terminology) could less ambiguously be considered an endors-
ing comment. In fact, the same court in Zurich fined a man in 2017 who 
liked a comment on Facebook that accused an animal rights activist of  
racism and anti-Semitism7. If  a like indicates appreciation and endorsement, 
a further question arises in the case when someone likes not the original 
content but someone else’s sharing of  the initial content. Would it be an 
appreciation of  the content, which could be object of  lawsuit if  the con-
tent is defamatory, or should it be seen as the appreciation of  the act of  
sharing the content, which appears to be free of  potential legal charges?
These cases also lead us to distinguish between defamation (libel, that 
is, the untruthful attribution to a person of  crimes, questionable behaviors 
or facts) and general cases of  bullying, harassment, and degradation. The 
dissemination of  content that has no necessarily propositional content 
(truth value), but has a shaming effect on the victim, is a responsibility of  
the sharer, not only of  the original author. For example, if  I share a photo 
or a video that ridicules a person and affects his reputation, it does not 
matter whether the photo is a simple digital manipulation or represents a 
real fact: it has no real truth value, but is something capable of  generating 
reputational damage, attacking a person’s self-esteem, and threatening her 
personal and social integrity.
In defamation cases, a defense could be either establishing the truth 
of  what has been stated or, as mitigating argument, showing that you rea-
sonably and honestly considered the source as reliable. But in messages 
that are shaming and degrading the presumption of  truthfulness becomes 
secondary, since the damage is simply done by diffusing the offensive con-
tent. In this case, the responsibility of  a sharer is greater, since the simple 
diffusion of  the content brings more publicity to it and more damage to 
the victim. This is the reason why the Director of  Public Prosecutions in 
UK recently stressed that retweeting an offensive tweet should be perse-
cuted in the same way as broadcasting one in the first place8. This means 
that sharing falsehood is less punishable or offers greater possibility for 
7 http://www.gerichte-zh.ch/fileadmin/user_upload/Medien/Medienmitteilungen/
Bezirksgericht_Zuerich/GG160246.pdf  (accessed on April 19, 2018).
8 http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/9633278/DPP-issues-warning-over-grossly-
offensive-retweets.html (accessed on April 19, 2018).
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defense than sharing content that has no truth-value but is offensive and 
detrimental to a person’s dignity. Of  course, defamatory statements could 
be considered offensive and degrading too, but for this reason they should 
be analyzed as having two components, namely a false proposition and 
a humiliating effect, with the sharer being potentially liable for the latter.
3. Different accounts of  sharing
In the present analysis we do not expect to resolve a complex legal 
debate, but rather to suggest that this debate partly originates in conflicting 
accounts of  what is done by sharing, from a semiotic and linguistic point 
of  view. I identify at least four prevalent views (or a combination thereof) 
concerning the meaning of  sharing, which could be interpreted as a) a full 
repetition / republishing of  the shared content, b) an affirmative linguis-
tic act (that is, an endorsement), that expresses validity or approval of  what 
has been shared, c) an act of  quoting, d) an ostensive gesture, that is, an 
indication towards content (that is, a pointing).
I will argue that, albeit every interpretation could be partially linked 
to the act of  sharing, actually none of  them captures its meaning in an 
exhaustive way.
a) Is sharing the simple replication of  the original content?
The legal debate about the distinction between the author’s and the 
sharer’s responsibility already showed us that sharing is not identical with 
making something public for the first time. For the same reason, discussion 
around ownership (e.g. of  an article or a photograph) often investigates 
if  a sharer is violating copyright laws in the republication of  third party 
material.
An author and a sharer may do things that are different, but they are 
not completely separate. They have, in fact, a common aspect that I con-
sider essential in defining what a sharer does, namely they both make the 
same content public, that is, they call the public’s attention to what they 
published. This becomes clear in the particular circumstance when the 
original author directly addresses potential users, soliciting them to “share” 
or “retweet” his message. If  a user does so, we would have strong reasons 
to say that in this case he is replicating the first author’s message and not 
simply quoting or endorsing it, since he is most probably responding to 
the explicit request for republication.
b) Is sharing an endorsement of  the original content?
In the case of  propositional content, such as an affirmation that can 
be true or false, an endorsement would mean that the sharer holds it to be 
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true. In the case of  other speech acts like directives (questions, requests or 
calls), an endorsement would mean that the sharer considers the directive 
as legitimate, backing the original writer in his request. Sharing could be an 
endorsement and this needs to be assessed in every individual case and 
depends on contextual factors: who is the author, what relationship does 
he have with the sharer, did the latter share a piece of  content that is co-
herent with his general views and so on. If  a person who is notoriously 
active in helping immigrants shares a violently anti-immigrant post by some 
activist at the opposite end of  the political spectrum, this act will be likely 
interpreted by his contacts as an expression of  outrage, not as an endorse-
ment (although some contacts might ask themselves if  he went crazy).
No matter if  sharing is interpreted as an endorsement, or on the 
contrary as a refusal or criticism, these conclusions are the product of  
inferences that are drawn in a similar fashion as indirect speech acts or 
Gricean implicatures. The statement «It’s cold here» is an indirect request 
if  it is stated to persuade another person to close the window, or the 
statement «You’re really brave!», if  clearly ironical, is said to convey the 
opposite meaning. Those inferences do not belong to the core meaning 
of  the speech act and are thus “cancellable” or detachable (Searle 1975b; 
Grice 1989; Levinson 1983). So it is possible to say «It’s cold, but I am 
not asking you to close the window», or «You’re really brave. And I do not 
say it in an ironic way». On the contrary, what belongs to the illocutive 
nucleus of  a speech-act could not be suspended in the same way. In fact, 
I cannot say «It’s cold, but I do not believe it», or «Close the window, but 
I’m not asking you to do it».
The popular disclaimer «Retweets do not equal endorsements» by Twit-
ter users is an example of  the attempt to cancel any inference leading to 
the assumption that the sharer could endorse what he retweets, avoiding 
implicating the sharer in legal disputes in cases of  misinformation or libel. 
Although the disclaimer would not be sufficient to always protect someone 
from liability, it is a legitimate move from a pragmatic point of  view.
c) Is sharing the same as quoting?
Sharing has also been equated to an act of  quoting (Oomens 2017). 
Quoting is a complex topic in the philosophy of  language that includes the 
problem of  how quotations work and what they refer to (Cappelen 1997). 
Traditionally, quoting deals with the basic distinction between mention and 
use, which bears resemblance with the question of  whether shared con-
tent is simply displayed or used by the sharer in the first person. But the 
sharing-device is freed from semantical and pragmatical complications of  
linguistic quoting, because it is not comparable to using quotation marks 
that refer to some expression, since it simply consists of  resubmitting to 
the public the very same utterance or content that has been published in 
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the past, no matter if  in the form of  an automatic retweet, a quoted tweet 
(RT in Twitter), a shared post or through copying the link of  someone’s 
post in one’s own status update window in Facebook.
Albeit having relevant similarities, there are some essential distinctions 
between sharing and quoting. First of  all, a quotation is an assertion that 
could be true or false («John said “It is cold”»), while sharing is simply the 
display of  preexisting content in the social network feed. If  John did not 
say those words, the sentence «John said “it is cold”» would be an assertion 
about something that did not happen, but it would still be an assertion. A 
false or mistaken retweet (RT @John «it is cold») is not a retweet about 
a communication that did not take place, but it is simply not a retweet at 
all, since you cannot share something that has never been said in the first 
place. It looks like a sharing act, but it is not.
On a practical level, this means that quoting, also in the context of  social 
network communication, appears to be less compromising than sharing. 
Writing in a post «John said “X is an idiot”» maybe shows little sensibility 
toward X, but is primarily a description that draws attention to what John 
allegedly said. On the contrary, taking John’s post «X is an idiot» from his 
feed and sharing it is a republication of  his words and not an assertion 
about what he said. This facilitates a stronger interpretation towards an 
implicit endorsement or acceptance of  John’s words.
The different focus between sharing and quoting is evident if  we 
consider the 2011 AP’s (Associated Press) Social Media Guideline9. While 
a direct and uncommented retweet such as: «RT@jonescampaign smith’s 
policies would destroy our schools» could be seen as a sign of  approval 
and an endorsement of  what is being relayed, and should consequently be 
avoided, the Guideline states:
However, we can judiciously retweet opinionated material if  we make clear we’re 
simply reporting it, much as we would quote it in a story. Introductory words help 
make the distinction. For example: “Jones campaign now denouncing Smith on edu-
cation. RT @jonescampaign Smith’s policies would destroy our schools”.
Another difference between quoting and sharing is the fact that quoting 
doesn’t allow for indirect speech acts to be endorsed by the person who 
is citing (cfr. Yamanashi 2001). Suppose that John, a co-worker, says «It 
is cold», as an indirect speech-act requesting that the heating should be 
turned on. If  I quote his words («John said “it’s cold”»), I’m only reporting 
what he said. On the other side, if  this happens in an online conversation, 
simply sharing his post («It’s cold») could be easily interpreted as the fact 
9 https://www.scribd.com/document/72536651/Social-Media-Guidelines-Associat-
ed-Press. See http://corp-live-bypass-ap.cphostaccess.com/assets/documents/social-me-
dia-guidelines_tcm28-9832.pdf  for the 2013 update (accessed on April 19, 2018).
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that I am also implying and endorsing the same indirect request. Sharing, 
here, is comparable with cases of  “mixed quotation” (Davidson 1979) in 
which a sentence, depending on context and interpretation, seems to be 
simultaneously mentioned and used.
A further consequence of  this is shown by the different degree of  
liability in the case of  a solicited re-posting or retweet (Allen 2014), as in 
the following example: «RT @John “Smith is guilty! Please retweet”». It 
should be noted that in this specific case of  solicited sharing, the retweeter 
could be clearly accountable for libel due to what is contained in the orig-
inal content. If  I retweet the message because I was asked to do so, it is 
more difficult to deny my endorsement of  the author’s will. The common 
rule that only ascribes the full responsibility of  a message to the original 
author would not be applicable in this case10. On the contrary, following 
the aforementioned AP’s Social Media Guidelines, using a quotation would 
avoid this consequence. Asserting «John wrote this: “Smith is guilty! Please 
retweet”», should be interpreted as a neutral description of  what John just 
wrote and asked.
d) Is sharing similar to pointing?
A more specific interpretation is that by sharing something we have 
the intention that other people watch / read the shared content, without 
thereby wanting to affirm or endorse the illocutive intention of  the original 
author. In other words, sharing could be compared to a kind of  pointing, 
that is, an ostensive or indicative gesture. An ostensive gesture is aimed 
at attracting the attention of  someone to certain content and at the same 
time is an “overt” action (Sperber and Wilson 1986), that is, the intention 
to attract the attention is openly displayed. On the contrary, simply plac-
ing something in the environment in order to direct someone’s attention 
at it (as in stealthily putting a compromising picture or a defaming text 
on the sidewalk for others to see) is not an overt action and therefore 
could not be considered a pointing or a sharing, but a manipulation. On 
the contrary, pointing to the picture on the sidewalk or even emphatically 
standing in front of  a person and putting the picture in front of  her eyes 
is an overt statement (through body language and gestures), analogous to 
saying «Look at this!».
On one hand, it looks like sharing is a kind of  pointing. On the oth-
er, we saw how the sharing or retweeting of  controversial content is not 
immune from criticism or even legal consequences. This would rule out 
the identification between sharing-acts and pointing. If  I come across a 
10 «The single publication rule should not be applied given the publisher’s role in 
actively soliciting for the retweet such that the retweet is a reasonably foreseeable publi-
cation by a third party» (Allen 2014: 96).
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(defamatory or humiliating) text and point at it with a gesture to friends 
(without expressing anything that could be interpreted as an endorsement 
or amusement), I would hardly be considered liable for this, at least in 
our common understanding of  pointing, even though there are signifi-
cant exceptions, like the more than a century old case of  Hird vs Wood 
(1894). In this case, a man sat by the side of  a road all day and pointed 
to a placard with a defamatory statement. There was no evidence as to 
who had really placed the placard there, but the court decided the man’s 
behavior was equivalent to publishing the libel.
The insistent directing of  attention in this particular case could be 
compared to the active spreading of  a message, like in handing out leaflets 
we did not write or making copies of  a text or a picture and, without 
saying a word, passing it on to other people or hanging them on walls and 
in publicly visible spaces. Constant and repeated pointing could be con-
sidered as a proof  of  the desire not only to momentarily direct attention 
to a message, but also to persuade others to accept the message’s content. 
Briefly pointing and making a reference to something is a momentary action, 
whereas continued pointing is an activity, something that has a significant 
duration in time.
In the same fashion, the question is whether sharing is a momentary 
action like normal pointing, taking place and ending when it is executed, or 
if  it is instead a permanent state or activity where a user “keeps sharing” 
and referencing something, since the user’s feed (or “wall”) keeps track 
of  this sharing-act. This would lead to the philosophical question around 
the nature of  a social network feed: is a feed simply a digital “past” that 
records what has been posted (but is not a current act anymore), or is 
it comparable to a permanent “present”, where all posts, if  they are not 
deleted, maintain their actuality in time?
A similar conundrum concerns the liability for content referenced 
through website hyperlinks. In the domain of  digital communication, hy-
perlinks are usually considered pointing devices. The Hird vs Wood case 
was in fact mentioned in a 2010 libel charge11 as analogous to linking on 
a website to third party sites where defamatory content was expressed. It 
was actually an uncommon decision, since it is more common to consider 
references to third party’s content by hyperlink not as an act of  publication 
of  that content, in order to safeguard the Internet’s freedom of  expression 
and protect service providers like search engines and newspapers from 
legal consequences. On the other hand, when the hyperlinked material 
is presented in a way that actually repeats and endorses the defamatory 
content, the hyperlink is considered libel as well (see Collins 2010).
11 http://swarb.co.uk/islam-expo-ltd-v-the-spectator-1828-ltd-and-another-qbd-30-
jul-2010/ (accessed on April 19, 2018).
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4. Sharing as an “attention directing” act
A conclusion of  the last section’s analysis is that sharing is something 
halfway between simple pointing and actively spreading. In the research on 
language evolution, pointing is considered a “proto-speech act” (Bates et al. 
1975; Tommasello 2003) or, when clearly conventionalized, a full-fledged 
request aimed at directing attention to something. This allows us to sug-
gest that sharing incorporates an imperative (i.e. a directive) component, 
as when we command «Look here».
Here we need to point out the fact that every content made public is 
aimed to attract attention. But there is a central difference to the act of  
sharing in the degree of  explicitation of  the user’s communicative intentions: 
directly posting someone else’s link on my webpage or social network feed 
leads others to recognize my intention to refer to that link. But referring 
to the link through an explicit act of  sharing is an expression of  the in-
tention to refer to the link, that is: “sharing” is a linguistic act in which 
the intention to refer to a content is itself  intentionally made explicit. In 
other words, while publicly posting a link to a content simply means to 
show that content to other viewers, explicitly sharing that link exhibits also 
of  this showing-intention. As a consequence, “showing that I would like 
to show you something” could be interpreted also as an assertion about 
the fact that I consider that content shareworthy12. This difference, in the 
context of  digital communication, is often subtle and can be described as 
the difference between casually hanging an article on a bulletin board and 
actively signaling (with signs, gestures, or by saying «Look here!») that you 
should read it. Sharing is therefore reducible to this component of  indicating 
the intention of  attracting your attention. It is a directive calling for other 
people’s attention and, at the same time, an assertion about the relevance 
or “shareworthiness” of  what is pointed to (a sort of  individual “content 
advertising”). An act of  sharing is therefore a speech act whose aim is to direct 
the attention of  other people to a content, stating (or expressing) its shareworthiness. 
In the same way that an assertive declares the fact that the propositional 
content is something to be believed and an order declares something to 
be done by the hearer (Searle 1989), sharing is a declaration that attention 
needs to be paid to a specific content.
Sharing is thus an “attention directing” speech act with its own illo-
cutionary structure13. Although a thorough analysis would go beyond the 
12 Any utterance, when enacted, calls for attention and directs it. When I say «It is 3 
pm», that directs my audience’s attention to that assertion. But sharing calls not only for 
attention toward the shared content, but also to the very intention of  calling attention to 
it. In other words, it is a case of  second order (indicating) intention.
13 This speech act does not create a new general illocutive category (assertive, di-
rective etc.), but it is structured as a combination of  them according to the new kind of  
conventionalized act of  sharing.
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scope of  this paper, we could outline the characteristics of  a sharing-act 
following Searle and Vanderveken’s (1985) analysis of  the factors that 
uniquely identify a speech act14. The first factor is the illocutionary point, 
which describes the aim of  a communicative action. As stated, the aim 
of  a sharing-act is to direct the addressee’s attention to something and to 
express the relevance or shareworthiness of  a specific piece of  content. A 
comment added to the shared content («look at this!», «that’s interesting!» 
etc.) could vary the strength of  the illocutionary point.
A sharing-act also has a specific mode of  achievement: it is possible to 
share content using mostly social media’s tools. The introduction of  a 
“share” or “retweet” function not only facilitates this action, but, for the 
first time, makes it possible to literally “pass on” content and make it public 
without physically copying it. Similarly, preparatory conditions are necessary for 
the non-defective performance of  an illocutionary act. In order to share 
content, it is necessary that the link or tweet to which one refers is real, 
or it should be assumed that a shared text is in a language that at least 
someone among my connections is able to read.
Also, illocutions can only be achieved if  their content follows specific 
conditions (content condition): for instance, I can only promise what is in 
the future and under my control. In the same way, I can only share some 
content that has been already produced and posted somewhere in the 
past. Sharing brand new content is not a real act of  sharing, but is simply 
a new publication.
The sincerity condition defines the necessary psychological state of  the 
person expressed by a speech act. The explicit negation of  this condition 
is incoherent or paradoxical: for instance, an assertive that denies the in-
tention to describe a fact is incoherent («The cat is on the mat, but I do 
not believe it» or «The cat is on the mat, but I do not intend to assert it»), 
and the same applies with a directive that negates its intention («I order 
you to open the window, but I do not mean for you to open the window»). 
The condition of  sincerity of  sharing consists in the intention of  directing 
others’ attention to this content. Therefore, it would be incoherent to say 
«I share p but I do not have the intention that p gets noticed» or «I share 
p, but I am not expressing the shareworthiness of  p».
All other inferences that derive from this speech act, such as the sharer’s 
potential endorsement of  what has been shared, are context-dependent 
perlocutionary effects that are not an essential part of  the illocutionary 
structure of  the sharing-act.
14 Illocutionary point, strength of  the illocutionary point, mode of  achievement, 
content condition, preparatory conditions, sincerity conditions, degree of  strength of  
sincerity condition. 
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5. Conclusion: sharing content, misinformation and the Spino-
zian view
Many ambiguities in defining what we do when we share something, 
as shown in the variability of  accounts in the legal debate (Collins 2010, 
Stewart 2013, Allen 2014), are in part dependent on a murky view of  
what kind of  communicative act “sharing” is. This analysis is an attempt 
to clarify a practice that is relevant in the dissemination of  information in 
social media and plays a non-minor role in phenomena like misinformation.
Sharing is an attention directing act toward information that is nor-
mally regarded by the sharer as interesting, shareworthy, curious, but not 
necessarily truthful. As we saw, from a legal point of  view sharers seem 
to be more accountable for content that could be degrading or humiliating 
(as in cyber-bullying) than for content that could be false. A sharer could 
feel that his responsibility in verifying the validity of  a specific piece of  
information is diluted in two respects: first, in the domain of  social media, 
only the original author is usually considered liable for publishing false 
or unwarranted information. Secondly, a sharer often leaves the task of  
a deeper verification of  a piece of  information to the community of  his 
connected users. The ease in pressing the “share” button meets the classical 
psychological phenomena of  the diffusion of  responsibility, encouraging 
a “crowd epistemology”, namely the tendency to attract other people’s 
attention as a device of  verification in case we are interested in content 
but we have little time to check for accuracy. But since most people have 
little time to do the fact-checking work, they in turn re-share, leaving this 
task to others and setting a potentially unrestricted flux of  partly-attended 
content in motion.
Commanding attention is easier than exercising attention. This phe-
nomenon is particularly prominent when information overload is the rule, 
like in social media communication. As Gabielkov et al. (2016) showed, 
59% of  shared articles and news is never read, neither by the sharer nor 
by the public, among which many eventually share again without reading. 
A consistent part of  the digital flux of  information could be therefore 
described as a huge flow of  attention-directing signals against a much 
smaller number of  users who are willing to focus. This means that signals 
of  shareworthiness and command of  attention assume a key epistemolog-
ical role in their own rights, since information is weighted according to its 
propensity to direct attention rather than its content (Wu 2016).
Passing on content without feeling the responsibility for its truth-value is 
exacerbated by the fact that false information tends to be easily believed. 
How people engage with information is well described by the traditional 
philosophical contrast between Descartes’ idea according to which we 
accept or reject information after considering its truth or falsehood and 
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Spinoza’s view according to which people accept by default all encountered 
information prima facie and only subsequently reject it, if  proven false. Em-
pirical evidence seems to support the Spinozian account (Gilbert, Tafarodi 
and Malone 1993): people tend to initially believe the information they 
are exposed to and they eventually verify or reject it only at a later stage, 
if  they have an interest to do so at all. This could explain the tendency 
people have to share information they have encountered without particular 
attention to its reliability.
Free circulation of  information and opinion is an important feature of  
the digital age, but at the same time it would be important to be aware that 
every content we pass on has an effect on the “ecosystem” of  our minds 
(Arielli and Bottazzini 2017). In the same way, as we learn to understand 
how our physical actions have an impact on the natural environment, there 
should similarly be the awareness that content we share leaves a mark on 
our cognitive and cultural environment. Signaling interest for some content 
becomes an active production of  content in itself: in the context of  digital 
communication, we are all “authors” that are able to influence, through 
sharing actions, the degree of  dissemination and impact of  content on 
other people’s minds.
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